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This paper evaluates the effectiveness of several governance mechanisms on 
microfinance institutions’ (MFI) performance. We first define performance as efficiency 
in reaching many poor clients. Following the literature on efficiency in banks, we 
estimate a stochastic cost frontier and measure output by the number of clients. 
Therefore, we capture the cost minimization goal and the goal of serving many poor 
clients, both of which are pursued by MFIs. We next explore the impact of measurable 
governance mechanisms on the individual efficiency coefficients. The results show that 
efficiency increases with a board size of up to nine members and decreases after that. 
MFIs in which the CEO chairs the board and those with a larger proportion of insiders 
are less efficient. The evidence also suggests that donors’ presence on the board is not 
beneficial. We do not find consistent evidence for the effect of competition, and we find 
weak evidence that MFIs in countries with mature regulatory environments reach fewer 
clients, while MFIs regulated by an independent banking authority are more efficient. 
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Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide banking services to the poor. An MFI must 
serve as many poor customers as possible while remaining financially sustainable. 
Annual spending on microfinance worldwide amounts to between US$800 million and 
$1.5 billion (Hartarska and Holtmann, 2006). MFI governance is a challenge to the 
further development of the microfinance industry (CSFI, 2008) and investors, donors, and 
governments are looking for effective mechanisms of control to ensure that MFIs make 
the best use of scarce resources.  
While previous studies have estimated the impact of MFI governance mechanisms 
separately along either social or financial dimensions (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and 
Strøm, 2009), this paper takes simultaneously into account both objectives of MFIs in 
evaluating the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms. We take advantage of an 
approach widely used to study efficiency in banks, modifying it to capture the duality of 
MFIs (see Allen et al., 2001). We measure performance using efficiency coefficients 
obtained from a stochastic cost frontier to capture the cost minimization objective of 
MFIs. Within the cost function, we measure output by the number of clients served in 
order to capture the outreach objective of serving as many poor clients as possible (see 
Caudill et al., 2009). 
The banking literature suggests that, after directly accounting for input prices, output 
quantity, technology-specific factors, and country characteristics, the remaining cost 
inefficiency is managerial (Fries and Taci, 2005; Bos and Kool, 2006). In a second step, 
the (predicted) individual efficiency coefficients from the cost function estimation are 
modelled as a function of measurable internal and external governance mechanisms. The 
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internal governance factors are those related to the MFI board and include its size, 
representations by various stakeholders and managerial capture. The external factors 
account for the weak market-disciplining mechanisms in microfinance, such as a lack of 
private shareholders, the limited role of competition, and differences in regulation. 
The results show that MFI efficiency is affected by certain governance mechanisms 
as suggested in the literature. In particular, MFIs are less efficient when the positions of 
the CEO and the board chair are merged; similarly, MFIs with a larger proportion of 
insiders (employees) on the board are less efficient. We also find that efficiency increases 
with a board size of up to eight or nine members and decreases after that. The evidence 
suggests that donors’ presence on the board is not beneficial, while that of creditors may 
be. We do not find consistent evidence that competition improves efficiency, although we 
do find weak evidence that MFIs in countries with mature regulatory environments could 
reach more clients by operating as a unit regulated by the banking authorities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section Two reviews the related 
literature and lays out the hypotheses to be tested. Section Three describes the empirical 
methodology. Section Four summarizes the data. The results are discussed in Section 
Five, while Section Six offers conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature has identified various links between firm performance and governance. 
MFIs operate as either non-profit or for-profit organizations in which shareholders are 
quasi-owners (large institutional donors) or charities, and seldom regular private 
investors. Therefore, a brief review of the existing corporate, banking, non-profit, and 
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microfinance governance literature is used to identify governance mechanisms relevant 
for MFIs, and to formulate and test empirical hypotheses. 
The first empirical study of this topic is Hartarska (2005), who uses survey data from 
a small sample of MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) to study how 
managerial compensation, board size and composition (stakeholder representation, 
gender, and skills), prudential regulations, external rating, and auditing affect financial 
performance. Financial performance is measured by the return on assets, and outreach 
results are measured by the number of borrowers and the depth of outreach (the clients’ 
poverty level). This study finds that some traditional control mechanisms, such as 
performance-based compensation, are ineffective, while others, such as board 
independence, improve performance. This work highlights the importance of identifying 
better performance measures to capture the dual objective of MFIs, rather than using the 
traditional accounting-based ROA and number of clients. For example, boards with a 
higher proportion of donors were found to have lower sustainability but a better depth of 
outreach, while MFIs with client representation have better sustainability but serve 
borrowers who are less poor. Hartarska (2005) also does not find consistent evidence that 
board size, regulation, audits, or ratings affect MFI outreach or sustainability. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) use a larger sample of rated MFIs and study whether and 
how such aspects of the CEO/chairman duality, female CEOs, international directors, 
board size, and external factors affect financial performance and outreach. They also find 
no evidence that typical governance mechanisms work, but their results may also be 
affected by not measuring simultaneously the dual objective. For example, they find that 
MFIs with female CEOs have better ROA; that MFIs with dual CEO/chairman positions 
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have a higher portfolio yield and serve more clients but show no other measurable 
performance difference; that MFIs with larger boards distribute smaller loans; and that 
external factors play a limited role at best. 
 
2.1 Internal governance 
Internal governance includes control mechanisms within the firm, such as the MFI board. 
In a typical MFI, board members are not paid, but their incentives are aligned with those 
of stakeholders, because members are legally responsible for effective monitoring. Such 
board members offer their reputation as collateral and will try to minimize the risk of 
damaging it (Handy, 1995). Uncompensated board members volunteer their time, 
because the mission of the organization matters to them. Those no longer committed to 
the mission leave, and substitutions are made by the remaining board members based on 
mutually agreed-upon criteria (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Directors may want to shirk 
their responsibility or simply get along with managers rather than govern effectively, but 
peer policing is expected to decrease the incidence of inappropriate board behaviour 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Holmstrom, 1999). 
In practice, MFIs want to identify board members who are able and willing to 
dedicate the time needed to effectively monitor management (Labie, 2001, 2003). Since 
MFIs’ managers strive to achieve outreach and sustainability, they reveal more 
information to their boards than what would have been revealed under a single profit 
maximization objective (Hartarska, 2002). Thus, the board plays an important role in an 
MFI, and this role is best captured by evaluating the board’s impact on a performance 
measure that captures the dual objectives of such organizations. 
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A significant part of the empirical literature has focused on the impact of board size 
on firm performance. Since free-riding is more likely in larger boards, there is evidence 
that larger boards are less effective in corporations as well as in small firms (Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Financial intermediaries usually have larger boards than do 
non-financial firms, but the empirical evidence shows both a positive and negative 
relation between board size and performance (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Pathan et al., 
2007; Belkhir, 2004). Studies on non-profit boards have suggested that larger boards may 
be more successful because of the additional duties that board members take on in 
supervising fundraising, but there is no empirical support for this claim (Oster and 
O’Reagan, 2004). 
Cheng (2008) finds evidence that larger corporate boards are associated with less 
variability in firm performance, because larger boards take longer to reach consensus and 
their decisions are less extreme. The dual objective of the MFI and the importance of 
communicating stability to customers in an MFI would suggest that there may be benefits 
to larger size. Yet thus far, the empirical evidence is mixed. Hartarska (2005) did not find 
consistent evidence of a positive impact of larger boards on a ROA, or on the number of 
actual borrowers, while Mersland and Strøm (2009) found weak evidence that MFIs with 
larger boards offer smaller-sized loans, suggesting the targeting of poorer clients. 
Since none of these studies used a measure that captures outreach and sustainability 
simultaneously, we propose the following hypothesis in its null form. Hypothesis 1. H0: 
Board size has no impact on performance. Moreover, we test for a quadratic relation 
between size and efficiency to determine whether the no impact results found up to this 
point were due to a possible non-linear relation between board size and performance. 
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Board composition reflects a board’s quality and its ability to monitor and advise the 
manager (Boone et al., 2007). Several aspects of board composition are usually 
considered in the literature, and the impact of both independent directors and separated 
CEO/Board Chair roles seems most important (Bhagat and Jefferie, 2002).
1
 Empirical 
studies, however, have found both a positive and a negative relation between the 
proportion of outside directors and firm performance (Mayers et al.,1997; Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1997). 
The explanation given by the corporate governance literature is that when a firm 
operates in a noisy environment, board monitoring costs are higher and there will be less 
monitoring (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The empirical findings from high-growth firms 
show that they have smaller boards with a high proportion of insiders, since outside 
directors are less effective (Coles et al., 2008). Firms facing greater information 
asymmetry will have less independent boards because of the higher cost of monitoring 
(Linck et al., 2008). However, the expected benefits of an inside director's expert 
knowledge outweigh the expected costs of managerial entrenchment when managerial 
and outside shareholder interests are closely aligned, usually via equity-based 
compensation (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). MFIs do not have typical shareholders and 
do not use high-powered incentives, because such incentives may not be appropriate for 
managers pursuing double objectives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Hartarska, 2005). 
                                                 
1
 Some authors have argued that with endogenously chosen boards, differences in performance may be 
attributed to specification issues (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Recently, however, a study by Cornett 
and Tehranian (2008) shows that if a firm’s performance is adjusted for earning management, the measured 
importance of governance variables increases and the impact of incentive-based compensation on corporate 
performance decreases; thus, the presence of independent outside directors, the institutional ownership of 
shares, and representation on the board of directors can have a direct impact on performance. 
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Typically, banks have a larger proportions of outside directors, and empirical work 
finds that the proportion of independent directors has a positive impact on performance in 
some banks (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Pathan et al., 2008). In non-profits, boards are 
comprised mostly of outsiders, so the potential conflict between insiders and outsiders is 
less relevant. 
The collapse of the MFI Corposol/Finansol in Colombia has been attributed to a lack 
of proper board independence and to poor oversight, both of which allowed too much 
power to be concentrated in the hands of one executive (Otero and Chu, 2002). For a 
sample of MFIs in the ECA region, Hartarska (2005) finds that MFIs with a larger 
proportion of independent directors achieve better outreach, but she finds no effect on 
financial results. That is why estimating the impact on a measure that captures MFIs’ 
additional objective of outreach is important. Therefore, we form Hypothesis 2. H0: The 
proportion of insiders on the board, measured as the proportion of employees on the 
board, does not affect performance. 
 In some MFIs, the CEO is also the chairman of the board, in spite of previous calls to 
split the role. Such a duality may be a sign of CEO entrenchment (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991, 1998), since then the CEO may pursue policies that allow him private 
benefits. While Brickley et al. (1997) did not find that firms with a CEO-chairman split 
outperformed those with a CEO-chairman duality in corporate boards, Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) found that in MFIs, this duality had a positive impact on portfolio yields 
and on the number of clients served. It did not, however, influence overall financial 
performance measures. The next hypothesis in null form is Hypothesis 3, H0: MFIs in 
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which the positions of CEO and board chair are split do not perform better than those in 
which the position is not split. 
Given the specific organizational type of MFI, representatives of other stakeholders 
such as donors, clients, employees, and creditors may also be included on the board to 
balance varying interests. The corporate governance literature in stakeholder system 
countries—for example, Germany, Japan, and France—studies the role of firms’ other 
stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the government 
(Hoshi, 1998; Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997). This literature acknowledges the existence of 
various agency conflicts, but argues that the success of the firm is in the best interests of 
all parties. For the German corporate governance system, in which employee 
representation on the supervisory board is typically legally mandated, Fauver and Fuerst 
(2006) find that labour representation provides a powerful means of monitoring and 
reduces agency costs, especially in firms with a greater need for coordination. 
Previous evidence shows that having bankers on the board improves the value and 
performance of German firms, perhaps by reducing the agency costs (Cable, 1985; 
Gorton and Schmidt, 2000). In the USA, bankers are rarely represented on boards of 
firms, because shareholder–creditor conflicts have been relatively unimportant (Kroszner 
and Strahan, 2001). 
Unlike most other boards, the MFI board may also include representatives of social 
investors (when the organization has raised funds in the external markets), donors, and 
clients. These groups of stakeholders may play a role similar to that of large blocks of 
stakeholders and may improve efficiency. The interests of each group may not coincide 
with the interest of the other two groups—for example, investors may prefer better 
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returns, while donors and clients may prefer outreach, as suggested in Hartarska (2005). 
However, Mersland and Strøm (2009) do not find that these stakeholder groups influence 
performance. Therefore, we formulate a fourth hypothesis. Hypothesis 4. H0: The 
proportion of each group of creditors, clients, and donors on the board does not affect 
performance. 
 
2.2 External factors 
MFIs are remarkably diverse. They operate as regulated or unregulated, and are 
registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private banks, non-bank financial 
institutions, or member-owned cooperatives with various costs of ownership (Mersland, 
2009). However, Mersland and Strøm (2008) find a minimal difference in performance 
between shareholder-owned MFIs and other MFIs, and Herrmann and Frank (2002) 
provide similar evidence for foundation-owned firms versus private firms in Germany. 
Regulation may impact MFI performance by changing the internal rules of the 
organization. Although prudential regulation imposed on MFIs accepting deposits can be 
justified (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), the cost of designing and enforcing regulatory 
policies to address the specific challenges of microfinance is substantial and may 
outweigh potential benefits (Steel and Andah, 2003; Theodore and Trigo Loubiere, 
2002). Regulation introduces the regulator as an additional stakeholder, and this may lead 
to  mission drift if the need to fulfil regulatory requirements diverts attention away from 
the objective of serving the poor (e.g., by shifting the focus from serving poor clients to 
improving capital adequacy ratios); this may hold back the innovation in lending 
technology that has been the driving force behind MFIs’ ability to expand outreach and 
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serve poor clients (see ‘Special Issue on Microfinance’, forthcoming in World 
Development). In fact, summary statistics reported by the MicroBanking Bulletins show 
that regulated MFIs serve wealthier borrowers (www.themix.org). 
Several cross-country studies find that regulatory status and regulatory power of the 
supervisory body have no impact on financial sustainability or outreach (Hartarska, 2009; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2009). However, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) find that better 
outreach (measured as the number of borrowers) is associated with higher levels of 
savings, suggesting an indirect effect of regulation on outreach if regulation is required 
for deposit-taking activity. The next hypothesis to be tested in its null form is: Hypothesis 
5, H0: Bank regulation of MFIs and the level of regulatory burden in MFIs do not affect 
performance. 
Competition is another variable to consider. More intense competition may act as a 
substitute for strong internal governance (Hart, 1983, Schmidt 1997). However, 
competition may undermine institution-customer long-term relationships (Gorton and 
Winton, 2003). Competition among mission-driven organizations can improve the match 
between managers and the non-profit organization they choose to work for, thus 
improving overall efficiency, as shown by Besley and Ghatak (2004). However, 
McIntosh and Wydick (2005) show that competition among non-profit lenders 
exacerbates asymmetric information problems regarding borrower indebtedness and 
causes more borrowers to seek additional debt, thus creating a negative externality that 
leads to worse loan contracts for all borrowers. In a follow-up empirical paper, McIntosh 
et al. (2005) show that in Uganda, the entrance of competitors led to a decline in loan 
repayment and the exit of larger borrowers. 
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Evidence from countries with competitive microfinance markets in individual 
countries such as Bolivia and Uganda indicates that too much competition may decrease 
profitability (as in the case of Bolivia), although it may lower interest rates that borrowers 
are charged (as in Uganda and Bangladesh), and thus presumably may affect outreach 
(Porteous, 2006). Cross-country studies are mixed, with some evidence of no impact 
(Mersland and Strøm, 2009) and weak evidence of positive impact (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007). 
Thus, the sixth hypothesis to be tested in the null form is H0: The intensity of 
microfinance competition does not affect performance. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
The above hypotheses are tested using the following model: 
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The dependent variable performance is chosen to address the challenge of studying 
organizations with dual objectives and is measured by outreach efficiency or, simply put, 
efficiency. The mission of MFIs in particular is to serve as many low-income clients as 
possible (outreach), while remaining financially viable. Since both non-profit and for-
profit MFIs strive to minimize costs, technical efficiency in outreach delivery resulting 
from a cost-minimization problem is an appropriate dependent variable. 
In the banking literature, several studies use this performance measure as the 
dependent variable in exploring the impact of various governance mechanisms. For 
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example, studies by Berger and Mester (1997) regarding the impact of board 
independence on efficiency and by DeYoung et al. (2001) on the role of management 
ownership in bank profit efficiency use a stochastic cost frontier. In its simplest form, this 
approach posits a stochastic model for a cross-sectional frontier with a two-component 
disturbance specification: one error term is the usual two-sided noise component, while 
the other is a one-sided disturbance component associated with inefficiency (Fare et al., 
1994). The main advantage of this approach is that it accommodates statistical noise by 
allowing deviations from the frontier to be associated with both inefficiency and random 
factors, thus avoiding the possible overestimation of inefficiency.
2
 
This approach can accommodate the dual objective of MFIs, because output can be 
measured in terms of either the dollar value of loans or the number of clients served. 
When outputs are measured as the number of clients served, the resulting individual 
technical efficiency coefficients capture the efficiency in serving as many poor clients as 
possible by minimizing costs. 
We first estimate a stochastic translog cost frontier of the form: 
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Cost frontier analysis implies cost minimization (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The cost function is of 
the form ),,( iii pycC  , where Ci is the actual cost of producer i and c(.) is the efficient cost function 
of output yi, input prices pi, and a vector of coefficients. The difference between the actual and the efficient 
cost is captured in the error term ei, which consists of two parts: the truly random shock vi and the cost 
inefficiency term ui, which is random but non-negative. While several distributional assumptions about u 
and v are possible, they are always assumed to be independently distributed: 
),0( ~ 2vi Niidv  ;     (2) 
 ),0( ~ 2ui Niidu 

. 
With these specifications, it is possible to derive the marginal density, mean, and variance of ei = ui + vi. 
Using these, an expression for the conditional distribution of u given e can be obtained: f(u|e). Thus, 
estimating the cost function that incorporates ei using either MLE or the method of moments provides 































where C is total cost, yk are outputs, pj are input prices,   ,,,, and are parameters to 
be estimated, uln  is the inefficiency term assumed to be one-sided (half-normally 
distributed), and ln  is two-sided, normally distributed. Standard restrictions are 
imposed by dividing all prices and quantities by the price of physical capital. Individual 
coefficients of technical efficiency are derived from this equation and are used as the 
dependent variable to estimate equation (1). Specifically, cost efficiency CEi, is 
)|}(exp{ ii euE   and technical outreach efficiency is TEi=1/CEi and is used to study the 
impact of governance variables (see Coelli et al., 2005 p. 265).
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In equation (3), output is measured as the number of borrowers or number of clients 
(borrowers and savers) to account for the outreach goal of serving as many clients as 
possible, as in Caudill et al. (2009). For a robustness check, models with the volume of 
loans as the dependent variable are also estimated. The inputs in the cost function are 
labour, physical capital, and financial capital. The price of labour is the average annual 
salary per employee calculated as personnel expense divided by the number of 
employees. The price of physical capital is the operating expenses minus personnel 
expenses divided by fixed assets. The price of financial capital is the weighted cost of 
capital. The total costs (C) are defined as the sum of input prices and quantities. 
                                                 
3
 Battese and Coelli (1995) developed a one-stage model that has gained some popularity, but Greene 
(2002) argues that these models are developed for only truncated normal distribution, and in cross-country 
studies, would not represent a substantial improvement over the more traditional technique, which is what 
we use in this paper. 
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Recent banking studies argue that firm-specific characteristics and, in cross-country 
studies, country-specific factors affect efficiency; therefore, MFI-specific variables and 
country dummies are also included in the cost frontier function (Fries and Taci, 2005; 
Bos and Kool, 2006). The literature review section also shows that several control 
variables must be included directly in the cost function, so that the resulting inefficiency 
is attributed to managerial inefficiency, which in turn is affected by the governance 
mechanisms. 
Therefore, we control for age, size, and portfolio risk levels, as we expect that 
learning occurs over the life of the MFI and that, with the passage of time, managers gain 
experience in that institution and environment (Caudill et al., 2009). We include a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the MFI specifically targets women, and 
zero otherwise, since women have better repayment rates and loans to women may be 
less expensive (Hulme, 1991, Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). We also include a 
variable that controls for non-profit status, links with international networks, and the 
provision of non-financial services, as recent studies have shown that these variables 
influence the performance of the MFI (e.g., Karlan and Valdiva, 2006). 
The cost efficiency estimation, therefore, includes MFI age measured in years from 
the start of microfinance activity, MFI size measured in the log of the assets, and risk 
measured as the percentage of the portfolio more than 30 days overdue. Microfinance 
production technology-specific variables included are Ownunit, which takes on the value 
of one if the MFI is an independent organization (not a branch of a major MFI or a 
development organization), and zero otherwise; Purefinserv, which takes on the value of 
one if the MFI only provides financial services (since some offer client training and other 
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services), and zero otherwise; Intinitiated, which takes on the value of one if the MFI was 
created by an international organization; Gender, which takes on the value of one if the 
MFI targets women specifically, and NGO, which takes on the value of one if the MFI is 
registered as a non-profit organization. 
The above factors are beyond managerial control, influence efficiency directly, and 
are included directly in the cost function. The estimated technical efficiency is a result of 
managerial effort that is affected by governance mechanisms. Therefore, as in Berger and 
Mester (1997) and DeYoung et al. (2001), efficiency coefficients are the dependent 
variable in a second-stage regression to test how internal and external governance 
mechanisms influence managers’ performance in terms of the efficient delivery of 
outreach. 
 
4. The Data 
The dataset was constructed from publicly available data from www.ratingfund.org. It 
consists of all available risk assessment reports conducted by five major rating agencies 
(MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril), as of June 2007. The 
methodologies applied by the rating agencies have been compared, and no major 
differences in how they assess MFIs relevant for this study have been found. Each of the 
five rating agencies is approved to rate and assess MFIs according to the Rating Fund of 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). The MFIs in the sample opened up 
their accounts to the careful scrutiny of the rating agencies, and their rating reports are 
publicly available, because (partial) funding for the rating itself was provided by the 
Rating Fund. 
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The willingness of these MFIs to share their financial and organizational data and 
donors’ willingness to make the data publicly available reflect the industry’s tendency 
towards greater transparency. To date, the dataset analysed here remains the highest-
quality, publicly available cross-section of data for MFIs worldwide. Alternative data are 
collected and screened by the Micro Banking Bulletin, but they are not publicly available 
(nor are they available to researchers), while data collected by the Mix Market are self-
reported and incomplete. Moreover, these two datasets do not contain governance data. 
The rating reports in the database are from 2000 to 2007, with the majority coming 
from the last four years. The reports contain financial information for up to four years. 
Financial values have been annualized and converted to US dollars using prevailing 
official exchange rates. The rating agencies differ in terms of the information they make 
available in the reports. Thus, the variables consist of different numbers of observations, 
which are reflected in the different number of observations in the regressions. 
 The main dataset consists of 278 MFIs from 60 countries. Since not all MFIs have 
complete information that can be used to estimate efficiency, and since not all of them 
provide detailed information on their governance, the data used consist of between 260 to 
380 annual observations depending on the model specification, or about 155 MFIs from 
45 countries. Table 1 lists all countries and the total number of observations from each 
country. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis. The first 
part contains variables used in the cost function. It shows that the average MFI included 
in the analysis serves 11,378 clients including 9,247 borrowers, and has an outstanding 
loan portfolio of 4.2 million US dollars. The average annual employee salary is slightly 
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less than $7,000, the average ratio of non-labour operating expense to fixed capital is 3.4, 
and the average cost of capital is eight percent. The average MFI age and size is eight and 
one half years and $2.7 million in total assets, respectively. The average risk, measured as 
the portfolio at risk overdue more than 30 days, is seven percent. The majority of MFIs 
are independent institutions (90 percent) and provide only financial services (85 percent). 
In addition, about one-third were created by international initiators, one-third target 
women specifically, more than 60 percent operate as non-profits, and one-third are 
regulated by independent banking authorities. 
The estimated technical outreach efficiency coefficients from the stochastic cost 
frontier used for the second stage of the analysis are presented next. The average values 
of these coefficients remain almost the same, even when output is measured by the 
number of borrowers or savers. As previous banking studies demonstrate, efficiency 
coefficients are higher when output is measured as the volume of loans than when it is 
measured as the number of clients, but the difference for the average MFI in this sample 
is only a few percent (53 percent versus 48 percent). 
Summary statistics for internal and external governance variables are presented next. 
Board size is measured by the number of board members, and the square term is also 
calculated and included to capture the possible non-linear impact of this variable. Other 
internal governance variables include the proportion of clients, employees, donors, and 
debt holders on the board, and a dummy that controls for a CEO’s dual role as the chair 
of the board. The average board in the sample consists of seven members; stakeholder 
groups are included as members, but in small numbers only.
4
 For example, only eight 
                                                 
4
 Ex-ante knowledge of the microfinance industry indicates that stakeholder representation is not very 
popular on MFI boards (Labie, 2003). Thus, when the rating reports provided information about board 
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percent of the boards have employee representation and three percent have creditors 
representation; 11 percent and 12 percent have donor and client representation, 
respectively (the averages for all boards being seven and nine percent, respectively). This 
ex-ante knowledge indicates that stakeholder representation is not very common in MFI 
boards, but this representation has been recommended, and it was important to find out if 
the results would show an impact. Finally, in 10 percent of cases, the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, indicating that there is a reasonable separation of management and 
control but that the role of this duality in microfinance still needs to be explored. 
External governance mechanisms include several indexes: an index for the level of 
competition, an index for the enabling regulatory environment and a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of one if the MFI is regulated by a banking authority, and an index of 
corruption perception. The level of competition is measured according to a subjective 
index using a scale based on competition information provided in the rating reports and 
compiled by the rater. We subjectively evaluate this information to indicate the level of 
market competition on a 1-to-7-point scale, with 7 being the most competitive. Since the 
raters have multi-country experience and have rated dozens of MFIs, we expect that they 
possess comparative information about countries and markets. Furthermore, since many 
MFIs have only local or regional coverage, proxies for a national level of competition, 
such as relative numbers of MFI-clients or a Herfindahl type index would be less reliable 
than this proxy. 
Similarly, the influence of the enabling regulatory environment is measured by an 
index of regulation that takes on values from 1 to 7, where higher levels indicate a more 
                                                                                                                                                 
members, it was assumed to be worth reporting if some members were representing a special stakeholder 
group.  
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mature regulatory environment as judged by the rating agency in the written information 
provided in the rating report. A dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if the 
MFI is regulated by an independent banking authority, and zero otherwise, is also 
included in order to capture the impact of banking regulation in particular. Other controls 
are per capita gross national income (used to measure the level of economic 
development), population density, number of existing MFI clients, and country 
corruption perception index from the Mix-Market database (www.mixmarket.org). 
 
5. Discussion of the results 
We first estimate a cost frontier using all observations with available data for the 
variables entering the cost function (described above). Next, the derived technical 
efficiency is regressed only on internal, only on external, and on both internal and 
external governance variables. The regressions are run with the dependent variable 
obtained from a cost function where output is measured as the number of active clients 
served (borrowers and savers), and the results presented in the first three columns of 
Table 3. Next, the procedure is repeated, and the dependent variable contains the 
technical efficiencies estimated from the cost function where output is measured as the 
number of active borrowers only and results are presented in the last three columns of 
Table 3. For a robustness check, the technical efficiency from the cost function where 
output is measured as the volume of loans is also estimated and used as a dependent 
variable, with the results presented in Table 4.
5
 
                                                 
5
 We also tested for the possible endogeneity of each of the internal governance variables and then tested 
for them jointly in the efficiency function (see Wooldridge, 2002), but we did not find evidence of 
endogeneity. As discussed in footnote (3), an alternative check could be the one-step procedure, but it 
might not be appropriate. We tried this method but not all models converged, and those that did showed no 
 21 
Several of the hypotheses based on the literature review are supported by the results. 
First, we are able to reject the null of Hypothesis 1, namely that board size does not affect 
MFI performance. Preliminary analysis suggested that the impact of board size might not 
be linear, and that there might be an optimal board size; therefore, this variable is 
specified in linear and quadratic terms. The results indicate that there is some benefit to a 
larger board, but that this effect reverses after a certain size. These results are consistent 
with the literature on boards in banks and non-profits, for which boards are found to be 
larger than conventional boards. The results also are consistent with the idea that 
excessively large boards may suffer from free-riding. For the MFIs in the sample, the 
optimal board size is eight to nine members, which is slightly larger than the sample’s 
average board size of seven members. This result is different from that of the studies, 
which find no linear impact of board size (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). 
The result is also consistent with suggestions by Jensen (1993), who shows that corporate 
boards with more than seven or eight members are less effective monitors, because 
agency and coordination/communication costs increase. Moreover, the results here are 
robust and hold for all regressions with various output measures in first-stage cost 
function estimation. 
We also reject the null of Hypothesis 2 stating that there is no impact of employees on 
the board. Specifically, we find evidence that a board with a larger proportion of 
employees will have a negative impact on efficiency for the specifications that include 
both internal and external governance variables in Table 4, although not in models with 
internal governance variables only (but this specification is incomplete). We are able to 
conclude that in the sample of MFIs we analyze, the costs of effective monitoring may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence of endogeneity.  
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higher than the benefits from insider knowledge, since the few MFIs with employees on 
their boards are less efficient than the majority of MFIs that do not have employees on 
their boards. This result complements previous findings by Hartarska (2005) that client 
representation is associated with serving more but less poor clients. Another result 
confirming the lack of benefits of insider knowledge in microfinance is the fact that the 
dual CEO and board chair position is associated with less efficiency. The null hypothesis 
(No. 3) of no impact by this variable is rejected across all specifications and supports 
theoretical arguments for differentiating the position of board chair from that of the CEO. 
Evidence related to Hypothesis 4 on the effects of creditors, clients, and donors on the 
board is somewhat mixed. Boards with a higher proportion of creditors seem to be more 
efficient, but MFIs with a higher proportion of donors are less efficient, and the latter 
lends credence to the argument that donors’ presence may ensure continuous funding and 
thus impede incentives for cost minimization and efficiency, as suggested in Caudill et al. 
(2009). These results suggest that further investigation on the impact of various 
stakeholders is relevant and should be undertaken. 
We are able to reject the null of Hypothesis 5 of no impact by regulation. MFIs in 
markets with more mature regulatory systems are less efficient in reaching more clients, 
but the effect seems to be driven by the ability to reach savers, since the same result is not 
found in the alternative cost specifications where output is measured by the number of 
active borrowers or to the volume of loans. This suggests that in countries with a mature 
regulatory environment, MFIs find it more difficult to attract savers, perhaps because 
other banks collect the savings instead. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the 
fact that MFIs regulated by an independent bank authority are more efficient at reaching 
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more clients (savers and borrowers, as in Table 3, Models 2 and 3) but less efficient at 
distributing large volumes of loans (Table 4, Model 3). 
The results regarding the role of competition are mixed. When only external factors 
are included in the regression, we find that MFIs in more competitive environments are 
less efficient, contrary to expectations for non-financial firms as suggested by Hart 
(1983) and Schmidt (1997). This result does not hold when we control for internal 
governance factors, however (Table 4). It seems that in the absence of effective internal 
mechanisms of control, competition by financial institutions and in MFIs may harm 
efficiency, since lenders rely on long-term relationship to enforce contracts, and when the 
value of the relationship is destroyed by more lenders, MFIs are less efficient (Gorton 
and Winton, 2003; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005). This is consistent with the country-
level study by McIntosh et al. (2005) that did not account for the impact of internal 
governance. However, since the measure of competition is an index based on raters’ 
opinions, the lack of impact by this variable suggests that raters may not be as well-
informed about the market as expected. This is consistent with recent studies finding that 
ratings themselves are not a good mechanism of control (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
2008). 
We also find that countries with a higher level of corruption have less efficient MFIs, 
while other environmental factors do not seem to affect efficiency. Microfinance 
policymakers argue that the environment matters, but we still do not know which 
environmental factors do matter and how, and we do not find empirical evidence for the 
factors studied here. At the same time, the lack of environmental influence may also 
support the argument that microfinance is less influenced by the macroeconomic 
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environment, since it applies different loan methodologies, the institutions are often 
operated by non-profits, and they serve more customers operating in the informal sector 
than do regular banks (Krauss and Walter, 2008). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The popularity of microfinance has attracted a great deal of attention and money, and it 
has prompted investors, traditional donors, and governments to look for effective control 
mechanisms to ensure that MFIs make the best use of scarce resources. Recent papers 
have indicated that governance affects the outreach and sustainability dimensions of 
performance (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). This paper evaluates the 
impact of governance on a measure of performance that combines the dual objectives of 
MFIs, outreach, and sustainability. 
We use a quasi-intermediation approach similar to that used to study cost efficiency 
in financial intermediaries. MFI performance is measured by individual technical 
efficiency coefficients, obtained from a stochastic cost frontier estimation, that capture 
the cost minimization objective and, within the cost function, we measure output as the 
number of clients (savers and borrowers, and borrowers only) to capture the objective of 
serving as many clients as possible. The cost efficiency coefficients are transformed into 
individual technical efficiency coefficients and regressed on internal and external 
governance variables in a two-step procedure. The internal governance factors are board 
size, managerial capture of the board, and representation by various stakeholders. The 
external factors are competition and regulation. 
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We find that some governance mechanisms suggested by the literature influence 
MFIs’ efficiency. In particular, MFIs in which the positions of the CEO and board chair 
are merged are less efficient; similarly, MFIs with a larger proportion of insiders on the 
board are less efficient. We also find that managerial efficiency increases with board size 
up to nine members and decreases after that. The evidence also suggests that donors’ 
presence on the board is not beneficial, while that of creditors improves efficiency. The 
latter result should, however, be interpreted with caution, since very few MFIs in this 
sample have creditors as directors, but perhaps this warrants further study. We do not find 
consistent evidence that the information on external governance mechanisms provided by 
rating agencies improves efficiency, although we do find weak evidence that MFIs in 
countries with a mature regulatory environment could reach more clients, mainly by 
operating as regulated financial institutions. 
These findings indicate that most MFIs have already organized their internal 
governance relatively successfully. Improvements could be obtained by separating the 
position of CEO from that of board chair, minimizing the presence of insiders and 
donors, and perhaps encouraging the presence of creditors, as well as by expanding the 
board to include no more than nine representatives. Since the poverty level of clients is 
not captured in this study, future work could build on this approach and develop a 
measure of performance that also accounts for this dimension of MFI outreach. In 
addition, further studies and better data are needed to understand how MFI efficiency is 
influenced by external governance mechanisms, such as competition and regulation. 
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Table 1 
MFIs by country 
The first column lists the name of the country, the second column shows how many 
MFIs from that country are in the sample, and the last column shows the number of 
annual observations in the sample. 
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Country name Number of MFIs Annual observations 
Albania 3 9 
Argentina 1 4 
Armenia 1 2 
Azerbaijan 5 12 
Bangladesh 1 1 
Benin 3 7 
Bolivia 13 46 
Bosnia Herzegovina 7 22 
Brazil 8 28 
Bulgaria 1 4 
Cameroon 1 3 
Chile 1 4 
Colombia 1 2 
Croatia 1 2 
Dominican Republic 3 8 
Ecuador 13 34 
El Salvador 4 11 
Ethiopia 1 2 
Georgia 5 10 
Guatemala 3 7 
Haiti 1 3 
Honduras 6 15 
India 13 18 
Indonesia 1 1 
Jordan 2 6 
Kazakhstan 2 3 
Kyrgyzstan 1 3 
Mexico 10 34 
Moldova 1 3 
Morocco 3 6 
Mozambique 1 3 
Nicaragua 7 21 
Pakistan 1 1 
Paraguay 1 4 
Peru 16 58 
Philippines 4 4 
Romania 1 3 
Russian Federation 4 13 
Senegal 2 4 
Sri Lanka 1 1 
Tajikistan 3 5 
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Togo 1 2 
Uganda 1 3 
Vietnam 1 3 
Yugoslavia 2 8 






Descriptive statistics for variables used to estimate the cost function (equation 3) 
 
Descriptive statistics on the variables used to estimate the cost function, namely the 
US dollar value of outstanding loans, the number of active clients (both borrowers and 
savers), the number of active borrowers, the price of labour calculated as the average 
annual salary, the price of physical capital calculated as the ratio of average annual 
employee salary, the average ratio of non-labour operating expense to fixed capital, and 
the average cost of capital calculated as all interest payments on deposits and loans to 
total liability, the total cost calculated as the input quantities times input prices (or the 
financing and operating expense), MFI age since starting microfinance activities, the MFI 
size calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets, the value of total assets (for 
illustrative purpose, as only the logarithm form is included in the analysis), the portfolio 
at risk measured as loans overdue for more than 30 days, a dummy variable indicating 
that the MFI is an independent entity and not part of an international organization, a 
dummy variable indicating that the MFI provides only financial services, a dummy 
variable to indicate that the MFI was set up by an international organization, a dummy 





Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variables in the cost function      
    Volume of loans ($US) 496 4,200,021 5,601,365 28,173 35.9 mln  
    Number of active clients 481 11,378 26,542 113 419,514 
    Number of active borrowers 503 9,247 16,429 113 159,907 
    Price of labour 











    Price of physical capital 503 3.345 5.064 –0.23 67.65 
    Price of financial capital 503 0.088 0.202 0 1.10 
    Total Cost ($US) 497 1,151,588 1,484,592 16,615 19.2 mln 
    MFI age (years) 496 8.5 5.9 0 39.0 
    MFI size (ln[total assets]) 496 14.8 1.3 10.7 18.8 
    MFI Assets ($US) 496 5,540,225 8,979,175 42,638 144 mln 
    Risk (PAR>30 days) 496 0.069 0.093 0 0.681 
    Ownunit   496 0.905 0.293 0 1 
    Purefinserv 496 0.851 0.357 0 1 
    Initiated by int’l org  496 0.371 0.484 0 1 
    Gender  496 0.363 0.481 0 1 






Descriptive statistics for variables used to estimate equation (1) 
 
Descriptive statistics on the predicted technical efficiency coefficients from the 
stochastic cost frontier with three different measures of output, namely technical 
efficiency (TE) coefficients obtained from a cost function where output was measured by 
the number of active clients (borrowers and savers), by the number of active borrowers, 
and as the dollar value of outstanding loans. Descriptive statistics on external governance 
variables are on an index of competition created from the rating reports’ analysis of the 
competition, with a 1-to-7 scale, where 1 is the least competitive and 7 is the most 
competitive; an index for the enabling regulatory environment on a 1-to-7 point scale, 
where higher levels indicate a more mature regulatory environment also described by the 
rating agency, a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the MFI is regulated by 
a banking authority, and zero otherwise. Descriptive statistics on the internal governance 
variables are on the dummy that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the Chair of the 
board, on the board size measured by the number of board members, on the square of 
board size, on the proportions of board members who are clients, employees, donors, or 
debt holders. Descriptive statistics on macroeconomic variables are on the per capita 
gross national income (used to measure the level of economic development), on the 
population density in persons per square km, on the number of existing MFI clients, and 





Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Governance Variables       
TE (output is active borrowers) 496 0.489 0.191 0.212 0.931 
TE (output is active clients) 496 0.490 0.210 0.225 0.928 
TE (output is volume of loans) 496 0.534 0.178 0.240 0.930 
Index of competition 474 4.559 1.663 1 7 
Index of regulatory environment 462 4.084 1.662 1 7 
Regulated by banking authority 471 0.316 0.466 0 1 
CEO is Chair of the board 450 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Board size 435 7.078 4.043 0 33 
Board size squared 435 66.4 109.7 0 1,089 
Proportion board members that 
are employees  
367 0.019 0.130 0 1 
Proportion board members that 
are clients  
365 0.086 0.277 0 1 
Proportion board members that 
are creditors 
367 0.003 0.029 0 0.25 
Proportion of board members 
that are donors  
368 0.070 0.225 0 1 
Population density 449 75.686 97.561 6 1,061 
GNI per capita 447 1,949 1,523 110 8,350 
MFI clients in the country 441 21,891 19 21,914 21,824 
Country corruption perception 
index 
434 3.0 0.7 1.8 7.3 
      
 31 
Table 3 
Regression results from a stochastic frontier cost function, 
with three different measures of outputs 
 
The dependent variable is total costs calculated as input quantities times input prices. 
The cost function was estimated with three different measures of output; in the first 
column are results from a specification where output is the number of active borrowers, 
in the second column are results from a specification where output is the number of 
active clients (borrowers and savers), and the third column contains results from a 
specification where output is the dollar value of outstanding loans. Other explanatory 
variables are the price of labour (the average annual employee salary) scaled by the price 
of physical capital (ratio of non-labour expense to net fixed assets), the price of financial 
capital (financial costs to liability) also scaled by price of fixed capital, and their relevant 
interactions shown in (3). Additional controls are MFIs’ age in years since the start of 
microfinance activities, MFI size (natural logarithm of total assets), the portfolio at risk 
measured as loans overdue for more than 30 days, a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the MFI is an independent entity, and zero if a part of an international organization; 
a dummy variable taking the value of one if the MFI provides only financial services, and 
zero if it offers other services; a dummy variable taking the value of one if the MFI was 
set up by an international organization, and zero otherwise; a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the MFI targets women, and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the MFI is organized as an NGO. 
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  Cost  Cost Cost 
Constant –10.849  –10.889  –11.418  
 (–21.89) *** (–19.52) *** (–9.67) *** 
Y (output is the number of 
borrowers) 0.266      
 (8.61) ***     
Y (output is the number of 
clients)   0.278    
   (8.68) ***   
Y (output is the volume of 
loans)     0.173  
     (2.78) *** 
Price of labour 0.464  0.461  0.368  
 (19.26) *** (18.12) *** (14.24) *** 
Price of financial capital 0.346  0.334  0.392  
 (18.67) *** (16.61) *** (20.14) *** 
Y^2 0.079  0.079  0.037  
 (5.70) *** (6.04) *** (2.13) ** 
Price of labour^2  0.042  0.034  0.062  
 (2.67) *** (2.07) ** (3.44) *** 
Price of financial capital^2 0.118  0.111  0.111  
 (13.25) *** (11.34) *** (12.08) *** 
Pr of labour*Price of fin. capital –0.101  –0.092  –0.107  
  (–10.12) *** (–7.90) *** (–10.12) *** 
Y* Price of labour –0.004  –0.011  –0.050  
 (–0.32)  (–0.99)  (–3.43) *** 
Y* Price of financial capital –0.015  –0.014  0.024  
 (–1.90) * (–1.73) * (2.43) ** 
MFI age 0.006  0.001  0.006  
 (1.45)  (0.23)  (1.38)  
MFI size 0.634  0.636  0.641  
 (23.83) *** (23.37) *** (10.37) *** 
Risk 0.231  0.061  0.066  
 (1.25)  (0.30)  (0.34)  
Ownunit 0.014  0.015  0.009  
 (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.08)  
Purefinserv 0.092  0.072  0.042  
 (1.18)  (0.92)  (0.49)  
Initiated by int’l org 0.041  0.075  0.048  
 (0.72)  (1.30)  (0.75)  
Gender 0.093  0.120  0.273  
 (1.50)  (1.90) * (4.17) *** 
NGO –0.003  0.056  0.010  
 (–0.05)  (0.95)  (0.16)  
Observations 461  443  468  
Chi-squared 8,386.91   8,199.92   7,577.20   
t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 
Outreach efficiency regressed on internal and external governance variables 
 
The dependent variables are technical efficiency coefficients obtained from 
specifications of the cost function with outputs measured by the number of clients or 
borrowers. 
Internal governance variables are the board size measured by the number of board 
members, and its square term, the dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO 
is also the chair of the board, and zero otherwise, and the proportions of board members 
who are clients, employees, donors or debt holders. External governance variables are an 
index of competition created from rating reports’ analysis of the competition, with a 1-to-
7 scale, where 1 is the least competitive and 7 is the most competitive; an index for the 
enabling regulatory environment on a 1-to-7 point scale, where higher levels indicate a 
more mature regulatory environment also described by the rating agency, a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one if the MFI is regulated by a banking authority, and 
zero otherwise. Macroeconomic variables are the per capita gross national income (used 
to measure the level of economic development), the population density in persons per 
square km, on the number of existing MFI clients, and the corruption perception index for 
each country from the Mix-Market database (www.mixmarket.org). 
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 Dependent variable is technical efficiency 
(output is active clients) 
Dependent variable is technical efficiency 
(output is active borrowers) 
Constant 0.245 0.658 0.339 0.298 0.648 0.345 
 (3.42*** 10.18*** 5.64*** (4.84)*** 11.17)*** 6.38*** 
       
    Internal Governance        
       
Board size 0.060  0.088 0.044  0.060 
 (2.97)***  (7.21)*** (2.61)***  (5.36)*** 
Board size squared –0.003  –0.005 –0.002  –0.003 
 (2.65)***  (7.33)*** (2.33)**  (6.03)*** 
Prop of board members 









 (0.07)  (4.75)*** (0.03)  (1.79)* 










 (0.68)  (4.50)*** (0.09)  (2.58)** 
Proportion board 
members that are clients  
0.066  0.034 0.063  0.054 
 (1.62)  (0.75) (1.54)  (1.28) 
Prop. board members 
that are creditors  
 
1.311 
   
1.528 
  
 (10.77)***   (9.72)***   
Proportion board  









 (1.82)*  (4.12)*** (1.10)  (2.74)*** 
 
    External Governance  
      
       
Index of competition  –0.012 0.009  –0.017 0.000 
  (1.75)* (1.29)  (2.52)** (0.00) 










  (1.76)* (3.22)***  (0.32) (0.35) 










  (2.65)*** (3.18)***  (0.51) (1.33) 
Population density   –0.000 –0.000  –0.000 –0.000 
  (1.64) (1.89)*  (0.45) (0.17) 
GNI per capita   –0.000 –0.000  –0.000 –0.000 
  (0.99) (1.12)  (0.34) (0.58) 
MFI clients in the 
country 
 0.001 0.001  –0.001 –0.000 











  (1.93)* 3.11***  (2.17)** (2.21)** 
Observations 337 385 268 337 385 268 
R-squared 0.13 0.06 0.31 0.12 0.04 0.19 




Robustness check: Standard efficiency regressed on governance variables 
 
The dependent variable is the technical efficiency coefficient obtained from a cost 
function where output is measured as the dollar value of outstanding loans. Internal 
governance variables are the board size measured by the number of board members, and 
its square term, the dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the 
chair of the board, and zero otherwise, and the proportions of board members who are 
clients, employees, donors, or debt holders. External governance variables are an index of 
competition created from rating reports’ analysis of the competition, with a 1-to-7 scale, 
where 1 is the least competitive and 7 is the most competitive; an index for the enabling 
regulatory environment on a 1-to-7 point scale, where higher levels indicate a more 
mature regulatory environment also described by the rating agency, a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of one if the MFI is regulated by a banking authority, and zero 
otherwise. Macroeconomic variables are the per capita gross national income (used to 
measure the level of economic development), the population density in persons per 
square km, on the number of existing MFI clients, and the corruption perception index for 
each country from the Mix-Market database (www.mixmarket.org). 
 
 
 Dependent variable is technical efficiency 
(output is the volume of loans) 
Constant 0.339 0.720 0.421 
 (5.85)*** (13.41)*** 8.02)*** 
 
    Internal Governance    
    
Board size 0.047  0.062 
 (2.91)***  6.10)*** 
Board size squared –0.002  –0.003 
 (2.57)**  (6.72)*** 
CEO is Chair of the board –0.013  –0.103 
 (0.42)  (4.60)*** 
Proportion board members that are 
employees 
0.002  –0.050 
 (0.03)  (1.11) 
Proportion board members that are 
clients  
0.041  0.020 
 (1.07)  (0.50) 
Proportion board members that are 
creditors  
1.167   
 (11.15)***   
Proportion board members that are 
donors  
–0.048  –0.095 
 (1.31)  (2.86)*** 
    
     External Governance    
    
Index of competition  –0.021 –0.007 
  (3.47)*** (1.09) 
Index of regulatory environment   0.001 0.004 
  (0.25) (0.54) 
Regulated by banking authority  –0.020 –0.035 
  (1.10) (1.67)* 
Population density   –0.000 –0.000 
  (0.66) (0.47) 
GNI per capita   0.000 0.000 
  (0.25) (0.86) 
MFI clients in the country  –0.001 –0.000 
  (0.75) (0.46) 
Country corruption perception index  –0.035 –0.042 
  (2.81)*** (3.20)*** 
Observations 337 385 268 
R-squared 0.11 0.07 0.23 
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